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Transaction Costs in Education in Tanzania 
E Ex xe ec cu ut ti iv ve e   S Su um mm ma ar ry y   
 
This paper was written at the end of 2004 at a critical time in the development of the 
education sector in Tanzania and of rapid changes in the wider picture of government / 
development partner relations - characterised by rapid moves towards harmonisation, the 
development of a Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, and ‘Mkukuta’ the first of the 
‘second generation’ Poverty Reduction Strategies.   
 
One of the most frequently quoted expectations of donor harmonisation is reduced 
transaction costs (TCs), as an early step towards increased aid effectiveness.  This paper 
attempts to look at the different kinds of TC – administrative, tying and fiscal, to see how 
they play out through different funding instruments: projects, pooled fund support to the 
education sector, sector support, and what are their likely implications in the context of 
moves towards increased budget support.   
 
It is argued that TCs do exist only as discreet units (missions, reports, audits etc) which 
can be cut down upon with consequent increases in efficiency.  Rather they form the most 
visible part of a spectrum that should blend into sustainable partnership and commitment 
to doing what is necessary to eradicate poverty.  In practice this is not the case.  Despite 
dramatic improvements in the primary education sub-sector through the Primary 
Education Development Programme (PEDP), and very significant increases in donor 
funding, relationships between government and DPs have over the past few months been 
very poor.  Acrimony, particularly over the release of funding by the pooled fund partners 
and reporting of it, have led to very unpredictable financial flows to district and school 
level, with damaging effects on the quality of education.   
 
It is necessary to step back and look at the bigger picture of what is going on, including 
from a historical perspective.  Reform of the education sector is only one of a whole 
range of reforms, covering public service, financial management, local government, civil 
service, legal sector and others.  They are driven by an analysis that in themselves 
projects and sector level reforms in the past have not generated the changes that would 
eradicate poverty and are not likely to do so in the future.  More fundamental structural 
change is required, as an end itself and to mitigate some of the risk of putting more 
money into Budget Support.  All of this is to be supported by on-going high level 
dialogue to ensure that key decision makers are actively engaged.  This, it is argued, may 
be expensive in the short term TCs, but the potential long term gains justify the cost.    
 
To ensure that these gains in terms of aid effectiveness, government effectiveness and 
ultimately poverty eradication, this paper has highlighted a number of recommendations.  
It is central to appreciate that they have to be mutually supportive and proceed together.  
If DPs ‘harmonise’ without effective communication with government, for example, it 
can be constructed as donors ‘ganging up’.  OECD DAC gives good advice about 
working in sector wide and more harmonised approaches.  These are taken as given, and 
the following are additional points arising from observation of the education sector in 
Tanzania.   
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S Su um mm ma ar ry y   o of f   K Ke ey y   R Re ec co om mm me en nd da at ti io on ns s   
 
1 1. .      F Fo or r   G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   o of f   T Ta an nz za an ni ia a   
¾  Greater realism and assertiveness about needs and priorities.  For education this 
needs to be based on a national debate about the role of education in national 
development, and what ordinary and poor people say about what they need from 
the schooling system to help them eradicate poverty 
¾  Focus on capacity building, articulated through a clear long term strategy, and 
building out from the existing knowledge and understanding within MOEC and 
PO-RALG about how to run the sector 
¾  Finalise, including through legislation, an effective division of labour and of 
financial procedures between MOEC and PO-RALG 
¾  Despite the emphasis on reform programmes and processes which take up time of 
many senior level officials, it is necessary that the core business of government 
goes on as efficiently as possible:  existing management practices adhered to, 
audit queries responded to promptly and so on. 
¾  Greater risk taking to take advantage of the opportunities currently offered by DP 
enthusiasm for the reforms of the Mkapa leadership, at the same time as 
confidence in rejecting aid and / or new reforms when the costs seem likely to 
outweigh the benefits.   
 
   
2 2. .      G Go oo od d   P Pr ra ac ct ti ic ce e   B Be et tw we ee en n   G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   a an nd d   D DP Ps s. .   
 
¾  Invest the time to come to a genuine understanding; this is a serious challenge 
against the current imbalance of power in donor / recipient relationships and the 
Tanzanian historical familiarity with ‘being told what to do’, either during 
colonialism or by a top-down planning tradition.  High-level dialogue in the 
education sector, which the donors demand, is particularly difficult to sustain in 
the absence of a clear philosophy, such as formerly existed with the Education for 
Self Reliance policy.  There needs to be a clear and common understanding of the 
terms ‘leadership’, ‘ownership’, ‘partnership’, ‘accountability’, and their practical 
implications.  
¾  Prioritise a few strategic interventions, communicate them clearly to all 
stakeholders at all levels of society; move forward effectively on a few things 
rather than ineffectively on many.  Acknowledge the long time frame that is going 
to be necessary for strategic reforms.  ‘Failing to plan is planning to fail’.   
¾  Acknowledge and work to address the capacity gaps which exist on both sides.  
The literature is stronger on the aid recipient side than on the donor side; shifts 
away from ‘blue print approaches’ to development problems are certainly in the 
right direction, but much more can be done by insisting that DPs do more to 
understand country specific issues and challenges. 
¾  Money is not the only solution to development problems; there needs to be clear 
thinking about the kinds of issues which can often be addressed by an injection of 
cash (such as classroom shortages) and those that require at least as much 
thinking and learning as spending (such as building local accountability) Final version 
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¾  Ensure that new equally damaging mind-sets are not being created, like donor 
dependency, or individual enthusiasm for reform based on workshop allowances 
which supplement a meagre salary, as opposed to embedding training around 
strategic reforms to improve government services into an individual’s core job.   
 
 
2 2. .      G Go oo od d   P Pr ra ac ct ti ic ce es s   i in n   R Re el la at ti io on ns sh hi ip ps s   B Be et tw we ee en n   D DP Ps s   
 
¾  Take responsibility for building common ground with bi-lateral and UN agencies 
that currently have different approaches, whether ‘like minded’ and predisposed 
towards harmonisation, or not.  Regularly reassess what is being achieved in 
terms of long term sustainable progress, and what is not, through current 
approaches, whether these are projects and conventional use of technical 
assistance or increasing budget support.  A position of ‘pushing the debate 
forward’ amongst DPs has risks of (i) fragmenting the DP group (ii) undermining 
the coordination role of UN agencies (iii) pushing faster than GoT can move; the 
short comings of project approaches are better known but there are circumstances 
where they could be the most effective means of support.     
¾  Pooling of funding can help reduce the burden on government so long as the 
pooling arrangements does not create additional unworkable demands.   
¾  Silent partnerships and exiting from sectors can be helpful not only for 
government but also for overall DP effectiveness and coherence.  Education DPs 
in Tanzania cannot all come together for a meeting with less than about 3 months 
notice as there are so many institutions and individuals involved.   
¾  Building institutional memory among DPs so that new expatriate staff arriving in 
country get a collective DP picture, rather than from a single agency.  
¾  Working strategically in collaboration.  A day or so set aside for ‘retreat 
meetings’ can be more effective than 2-4 meetings a month for an hour or so at a 
time, where bigger picture issues cannot be resolved.  Education DPs in Tanzania 
have currently identified 16 distinct issues that they need to be working on
1, with 
limited sector specialists, no one agency can take responsibility for all of these 
effectively, so clear roles and responsibilities amongst DPs are critical.  Education 
specialists need to collaborate on developing inputs to other reform processes, 
rather than just doing this work within single agencies.   
¾  Doing the work of collaboration within the collaborating agencies, rather than 
relying on consultants.  If a consultant is used, then that person often finishes up 
with a better understanding than the body that commissioned the work, since all 
they get is the product.  Buying in the work is sometimes a symptom of 
collaboration being an add-on rather than being seen by the agency as central to 
harmonisation
2.   
                                                 
1 Education and core reform processes, education and local government reform, education and budgetary / 
resource planning processes, HIV/AIDS, equity, environment, gender, MDGs and EFA, Mkukuta, Poverty 
Reduction Budgetary Support, PETS, sector review processes, audit issues, future funding options, 
reporting and monitoring, high level dialogue. 
2 In addition, if the work is done unsatisfactorily by a consultant, DPs can collaborate in blaming the 
consultant and not use them again.  If the work is done less than satisfactorily by one of their own number, Final version 
 
Transaction Costs in Education in Tanzania 
 
3 3. .      G Go oo od d   P Pr ra ac ct ti ic ce es s   i in n   I In nd di iv vi id du ua al l   A Ag ge en nc ci ie es s   
3.1  Human Resources 
¾  Taking a long-term perspective on poverty and reform; staff induction to focus on 
historical perspectives as well as the immediate situation in a sector. 
¾  Consider longer tours of duty for expatriate staff 
¾  Draw effectively on the expertise of their own local staff 
¾  Professional appraisal of individual expatriate staff could give credit for depth of 
understanding of country specific issues as much as for keeping up to date with 
international debates, and for credibility with GoT partners as well as in the DP 
group.  Team players are more useful than officers keen to make an individual 
mark over a single tour of duty; 
3.2  Internal Consistency around Harmonisation 
¾  There is no point in an individual agency being ‘at the cutting edge’ of 
harmonisation work, if more work is not put into ensuring that others are 
travelling on the same path. 
¾  Legal and audit departments need to be as responsive to harmonisation trends as 
programme departments 
¾  There is a need to identify and eliminate the confusing signals that are given out 
by shifting to sector or budget support and developing new projects at the same 
time.  A better way is to be clearer about the comparative advantage of different 
funding instruments (project, sector support etc) in different circumstances, and 
use them accordingly. 
¾  Sector specialists and Heads of Aid are not always consistent about harmonised 
approaches.  Some agencies have sufficient latitude in their policy documents to 
cover quite widely differing approaches, which generates difficulties with 
personnel changes or when, for example, education specialists interact with 
governance specialists.  Strengthened internal communication and dialogue would 







This paper was written to serve two purposes: one to contribute a background paper on 
the education sector to the work of the Independent Monitoring Group in Tanzania, and 
the other a background paper to the UNHDR 2005, which is looking at aid effectiveness. 
This has necessitated more background information than many readers already familiar 
with the education sector in Tanzania might require, and a deviation from the formal style 
of previous IMG reports.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
it exposes capacity gaps and the challenge then of solving them, but this can be the means of reaching new 
levels of understanding and collaboration.   Final version 
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Despite these significant achievements and fine words in 2003, the European 
Commission report on the sector about a year later notes, ‘there is a growing perception 
especially in the Ministry of Education and Culture that donors and government are 
becoming two separate and possibly opposing camps’
3.  Mostly these derive from 
misunderstandings on both sides about needs and intentions, the nature of leadership, 
ownership, partnership and transparency.   
   
Whilst there is increasing academic and development professional interest in transaction 
costs (TCs), and their role in increasing aid effectiveness, there is a risk that it is a case of 
‘not seeing the wood for the trees’.  There is a great deal of rhetoric about how TCs can 
be reduced through more harmonised approaches and moves to budget support, not least 
through attention given to breaking them down into more manageable components – 
administrative costs, tying costs, fiscal costs.  This paper contends, however that: 
¾  TCs do not exist only as discreet units (missions, reports, audits, meetings etc) 
which can be cut down upon, with consequent increase in efficiency.  Rather they 
are part of a spectrum, the most visible part of which may be the missions, reports 
etc, but they should blend into sustainable dialogue, partnership and in the ideal 
case, a genuinely owned and shared commitment to doing what is necessary in 
terms of aid (as well as trade, and related issues) to eradicate poverty.   
¾  Without attention to some of the real underlying problems between government 
and donors in a particular sector, TCs (in the form of meetings, reports etc) will 
be shifted from one part of an agency to another, and from one part of government 
to another – which may relieve the current burden of frustration with them from 
some shoulders - but it will not ultimately contribute to greater aid effectiveness. 
¾  Part of the problem is lack of clarity on the part of the donors (collectively and 
individually) about what is the overall objective of their TC inducing activities: is 
it accounting for money (‘accountability to donors’)? ensuring technical advice is 
followed (‘donors as lobbyists’ / ‘technical advice as conditionality’)? or 
                                                 
3 European Delegation (2004) Evaluation of EU Support to Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) 
‘The overall story of PEDP is a positive one. Changes are occurring within the 
Primary Education sector across Tanzania. Considerably more children are in 
school than ever before, far more resources are being put into the sector as part 
of the GoT’s  Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the end users of the system, 
pupils, teachers and parents, are pleased that new and improved facilities are 
arising before their eyes, and especially so that their children are beginning to 
have books, more motivated teachers and improved teaching and learning 
environments. The recorded increase of 43% in enrolment in Standard One in 
2002 is an extraordinary achievement, perhaps unique in the world. Currently 
total enrolments in primary schools are more than 300,000 in excess of the stated 
PEDP Target for 2003.’ [MOEC (2003) Annual PEDP Review] Final version 
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promoting sustainable reforms and development, ultimately through 
accountability to Tanzanians?  These objectives can be mutually exclusive, 
particularly in a situation when donor government relations are poor.   
¾  The need of government officers to devote energies to working with and keeping 
up with the changing modalities and differing priorities of development partners, 
and the different kinds of costs involved, is what is referred to in the title as ‘the 
cost of poverty’, a phrase used by one of the interviewees in this research 
 
2 2. .      A An n   H Hi is st to or ri ic ca al l   P Pe er rs sp pe ec ct ti iv ve e      
It is vitally necessary to take a long perspective on recent developments in the education 
sector, because they have bear on the capacity gaps and ‘need to change mind-set’ that is 
the common currency of much donor comment on short-comings in the management of 
the sector.   
 
2 2. .1 1      O On n   E Ed du uc ca at ti io on n   
In the early years of independence, Tanzania developed an education policy tailored 
closely to the needs of a newly independent nation, with big skills shortages at the upper 
end of the educational spectrum, and very high levels of illiteracy at the other.  The 1967 
policy of ‘Education for Self Reliance’ set out directly and explicitly to redress historic 
imbalances in access to education, address manpower shortages, and to promote values of 
self reliance, self respect and African socialism.  Julius Nyerere, the first President of 
Tanzania, said the need was that, ‘our primary and secondary schools must prepare young 
people for the realities and needs of Tanzania’.  This policy was made concrete in the 
Musoma Declaration 1977 which provided for universal free primary education.  The 
expansion of enrolment to almost 100% followed by a fairly rapid decline in quality of 
education, and subsequently then of enrolment, is a well-known story.  By the early 
1990s, parents were being asked to pay a Universal Primary Education fee, of 
approximately $2 a year, to try to maintain a basic minimum quality of education.  The 
early 1990s were also a period of heavy donor disenchantment with Tanzania, Tanzanian 
failure to meet the demands of economic structural adjustment, and a feeling that things 
had to change.   
 
What changed in the education sector was the development of a new Education and 
Training Policy (ETP) in 1995, spurred not least by donor indications that they would not 
be happy to work in the sector without a clear and acceptable policy framework.  The 
difference between ETP and Education for Self Reliance is very significant.  Gone are all 
the references to the needs of Tanzania as an emerging nation and the knowledge, skills 
and values necessary for her people, and education as a tool for liberation.  ETP is a 
generic document, embracing a more liberal idea of education being to enable individuals 
to fulfil their potential.  With the possible exception of small references to pastoralist and 
fishing communities, it would be appropriate to many nations around the world.  Shortly 
after ETP, came the Basic Education Master Plan (1997), followed by the idea that 
support to basic education should fit within the context of a wider sector development, 
and hence the Education Sector Development Programme (1998).  Discussions about 
education reform continued through a Sector pre-Appraisal in 1998, and full Sector 
Appraisal in 1999 (involving 40 consultants working simultaneously for a week in Dar es Final version 
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Salaam’s most prestigious hotel).  Much was the frustration in the late 1990s that children 
that had entered their primary education when ETP was approved in 1995 were at the 
point of completing it without seeing any of the fruits of government / donor discussions 
on the way forward in the education sector
4.   
 
Discussions of the later 1990s, finally emerged into the Primary Education Development 
Programme (PEDP), stimulated not least by Tanzania reaching HIPC completion point, 
and education being identified as one of the priority sectors to benefit from debt relief, as 
well as a new World Bank loan.  In the first half of 2001 there was a flurry of planning 
activity between all stakeholders in education at the national level.  Activity involved a 
sector study carried out under close guidance of the World Bank, several large-scale 
national workshops, a number of international consultancies and a lot of follow-up 
hurriedly convened meetings.  In a matter of months the Primary Education Development 
Programme (2002 – 6) was put together.  It was unveiled in July 2001, but really took off 
in January 2002 with the new school year, and a 1.6 m surge in enrolment in primary 
school pupils.   It was greeted with much enthusiasm.  Detractors who raised early 
questions about the quality of education were silenced by Presidential logic:   
‘We can continue to debate the quality of education.  Even in rich countries they 
still do.  But not before the kids are in school!!  If you do not agree, tell us, whose 
children would you want to keep out until the quality of education has improved?  
Yours?’
5 
Detractors still raising questions about the on-going level of debt payments, the lack of 
public discussion about the new World Bank loan which partially supports it, and the link 
between expanding numbers and real poverty eradication have not gone away. Below the 
surface in many discussions with government officers, particularly at a more local level, 
is a sense that there is still a great deal of value and relevance in the Education for Self-
Reliance policy, that dependence on donor support may not be sustainable in the long 
term, and could be a double edged sword.   
 
2 2. .2 2      O On n   O Ot th he er r   R Re ef fo or rm ms s   
Alongside reform in the education sector, are a raft of other reforms, aiming to move 
away from what are seen to obstacles to development and poverty reduction.  These 
include Civil Service Reform, the thrust of which is to slim down the size of the civil 
service, and to enable salaries to be paid which are more in line with what people with 
comparable skills could expect to be paid in the non-state sector.  It is combined with 
approaches to work falling under the umbrella of ‘changing mind-set’.  This means a shift 
                                                 
4 See for example, Malcolm Mercer, Kathleen White and Naomi Katunzi (2000) Joint Mid- Term 
Evaluation of EC, DfID and IA Support to the Education Sectgor Development Programme Design, 
Preparation and Management Process.  This argued that huge amounts of time, and hundreds of thousands 
of dollars had been spent on promoting sector reform with very little in the way of tangible benefit.  
Interestingly, most donor staff currently in post were not in Tanzania at the time that this report was 
written, and few are even aware of it.   
5 Opening Address By The President Of The United Republic Of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin 
William Mkapa, At The Inaugural Tanzania Development Forum, Golden Tulip Hotel, Dar Es Salaam, 24 
April 2003 
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away from a ‘directive culture’, which developed in government service from the 1960s, 
alongside an approach of ‘accounting for inputs’ and demonstrating that procedures had 
been correctly followed, as opposed to newer workplace cultures of results based 
management and taking a proactive approach to planning and implementation.  Local 
Government Reform is aiming to decentralise decision making, to enable decisions to be 
taken closer to, and reflect more strongly the needs of, the end users of a government 
service.  There are also a whole raft of financial and budget reform measures, such as the 
introduction of MTEF, Public Expenditure Reviews and Public Expenditure Tracking 
Studies and so on which are meant to help ensure budgetary allocations are made in line 
with stated policy priorities, that the spending is made in line with allocations, and that 
the money does actually reach the service delivery unit.  Numerous sector reforms are 
combined with a consistent demand for ‘high level dialogue’ with the ministries 
concerned 
 
2 2. .. .3 3      C Co on nc cl lu us si io on n   
 
The point of this diversion into recent history, is that the substantial problems which 
delayed education reform in the 1990s, were not actually solved by the flurry of activity 
prior to the unveiling of PEDP, they were merely shelved.  Key problems remain, not 
least of which is a history and mindset for many Tanzanians of being told what to do by 
outsiders or those more powerful.  Education for Self Reliance was an attempt to break 
with this; it is by no means clear that all these supposedly ‘nationally owned’ reforms are.  
Again, it is hard to sustain a high level dialogue without an underpinning philosophy to 
bring to the discussion; what remains is a process of second guessing what the other 
participants in the dialogue want you to say
6.   
 
Again, as the education sector is gradually drawn into the other reform processes, gaps in 
understanding about needs and priorities for the sector become apparent, so do tensions 
around linkages with the other reform processes.  Different people stand to be winners 
and losers in this process, helping to ensure that whilst dialogue with potential winners 
may be relatively smooth, progress in implementation is less likely to be so.      
   
3 3. .      C Cu ur rr re en nt t   s st ta at te e   o of f   p pr ri im ma ar ry y   e ed du uc ca at ti io on n   s su ub b- -s se ec ct to or r   
 
The focus of this paper is on the primary education sub-sector, since that has been the 
priority issue under the PRS, and is the primary locus of changing dynamics about aid 
modalities and aid effectiveness.  A Secondary Education Development Programme 
(SEDP) will shortly come on stream, but is still at the final planning stage.  Changes are 
taking place very fast at the present time, with the EU having made a decision within the 
past few weeks to shift from a pooled fund to sector budget support, and changes to the 
Memorandum of Understanding between government and donors to the pooled fund are 
being discussed at the time of writing.  Heads of the various development partner 
agencies have already met once with the Minister of Education and Culture to express 
                                                 
6 cf : the attitude of ‘Tell us what you want and we will do it to get the money’ – a symptom of the problem 
caused by micro-management in the sector, according to Donald Hamilton, World Bank Education 
Adviser, Tanzania.   Final version 
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frustrations and more meetings are planned over coming weeks; it remains to be seen 
whether this level of dialogue makes substantial changes in sector development.  Despite 
these shifting grounds, PEPD provides key examples of what is happening over the 
medium term in the education sector and provides good ground for understanding TCs. 
  
The plans for PEDP were ambitious, and its early successes were cited at the beginning 
of this paper.   A sector briefing out deriving from Tanzania’s Participatory Poverty 
Assessment, showed clearly that much of what government was doing was seen as 
positive and constructive by research participants, but they also noted a desperate need 
for the following
7: 
¾  Better skills teaching: of literacy and numeracy, but also the need to acquire skills 
like critical and analytical thinking, rather than the absorption of information 
¾  Knowledge and Information related to daily life:  More than 80% of those 
completing primary school do not proceed, and these should have a syllabus that 
is appropriate to them, to enable them to reduce poverty.   
¾  Values which would assist with daily life:  hope and optimism, as opposed to the 
sense of hopelessness which afflicts the most vulnerable; closing the cultural gap 
between home and school; cooperation; participation, equal opportunities and 
rights for groups such as children with disabilities 
One of the recommendations of the report was to promote a broad national debate about 
the role of education in poverty reduction and national development – something which 
had been squeezed out of donor government ‘dialogue’ of the previous decade, with its 
increasing focus on the narrow and technical, and the speed of the planning, out of which 
PEDP finally emerged.   
 
This year’s annual review
8 tries to remain enthusiastic about achievements at school and 
community level, but notes that increases in enrolments have not kept to targets.  
Repetition rates are high – up to 10% in some classes.  Classroom construction while 
dramatic, reached only 72.7% of the target, with a more than 19,500 classrooms awaiting 
completion.  Teachers’ housing is a particular problem, as is shortage of desks and pit-
latrines.  Teacher recruitment is below target.  The focus of this year’s report is on quality 
of education, and much is written about capacity building, teacher training, developing a 
reading culture in schools, how to address cross cutting issues and concerns such as 
special needs education
9.  Despite the intended focus on quality, the overwhelming 
attention of the report is to institutional arrangements between ministries and financial 
arrangements – issues which continue to stand in the way of educational quality, PEDP 
really achieving its vision, and the needs of some of poorest Tanzanians being met.   
 
In the words of the 2004 review:   
‘There is a contrast between positive developments at school and community level 
and perceived levels of dysfunction at the centre. Senior officials and directors 
                                                 
7 TzPPA (2002/3) ‘Education and Vulnerability to Poverty in Tanzania’ Policy Briefing Paper, Working 
Draft, October 2003.   
8 URT, Ministry of Education and Culture (2004) ‘Joint Review of the Primary Education Development 
Programme (PEDP)’.   
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expressed disquiet over the lack of coherence in strategic planning, management 
and accountability, especially within MOEC. Criticism by ministries of other 
ministries involved in PEDP, and critical concerns expressed by funding partners of 
GoT’s performance, and vice versa, left the Review Team questioning what added 
value the superstructure is providing in the task of enhancing the experience of 
schooling for primary school pupils in Tanzania. PEDP is not simply about books 
and buildings, but about a process of community participation and the way people 
think, feel and value education. It is also about how education is prioritised in their 
lives. To an informed observer, providing more money and responsibility to 
schools, releasing them from burdensome bureaucratic controls and delays and 
contradictory directives, and making schools the locus of change seems to make 
good sense.’
10 
This seems to be transaction costs writ large in relations between donors and government, 
at the same time as a failure to address some of the internal ministry to ministry 
problems.  Both of these are standing in the way of what needs to be enabled at grassroots 
level, and the critical issue in terms of TCs, is the extent to which donor government 
interaction in education has become part of the problem and not the means to its solution.   
   
4 4. .      T Tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on n   C Co os st ts s: :   S So om me e   w wo or rk ki in ng g   d de ef fi in nt ti io on ns s   
 
4 4. .1 1   ‘ ‘T Th he e   l li in ne e   d do oe es sn n’ ’t t   g go o   t th hr ro ou ug gh h   t th ha at t   p po oi in nt t’ ’   
 
This was the response of one interviewee, conveying the point that the time involved in 
working through the necessary reforms to make aid effective, and reduce poverty, are not 
simply costs.  There is no blue-print of how, for example, to make national accountability 
work in a situation where the lion’s share of the development budget, as well as a 
proportion of the recurrent budget, is funded through aid
11.  In a situation where there are 
capacity gaps, amongst both donors and government, a genuinely working partnership 
can be about developing a common understanding of feasible ways forward in a 
particular national context, and towards achieving a shared goal.   
 
Such partnerships in education at national level in Tanzania, can only be said to exist to a 
very limited extent, and usually for a short period of time, for example around the process 
of producing a particular report or study.  Given the different perspectives that different 
stakeholders bring to the table, and given that their underlying assumptions are not 
discussed, this is perhaps hardly surprising.   
 
4 4. .2 2   A Ad dm mi in ni is st tr ra at ti iv ve e   C Co os st ts s   
 
These refer largely to the costs terms of meetings, reports, and arrangements for release 
and reporting of money and so on, which take up donor and government time.   In 
Tanzania, there are 20 ‘development partners’ in the education sector, reflecting its 
                                                 
10 Ibid page vi 
11 In 2001/2 Approved funding of PEDP was 71.9% from government, with the remainder from external 
financing.  In 2002/3 government share fell to 60.4% and again to 46.6% in 2003/4.  (URT, Education 
Public Expenditure Review, prepared by ESRF, April 2004, page 41.   Final version 
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priority in Tanzania’s first PRS.  The sector is widely regarded as oversubscribed, and the 
Like Minded Group (LMG) in Tanzania (which includes both those involved in direct 
budget support and Pooled Fund support to PEDP) recently commissioned a mapping 
study, and stimulated a self-evaluation exercise with a view to encouraging more silent 
partnerships, and exiting from the sector by the development partners making smaller 
financial contributions. 
 
In researching transaction costs, the effort was made to quantify them, but this has proved 
impossible.  Almost all those interviewed bemoaned the high level of TCs, but no one 
interviewed is actually trying to quantify them.  There were a number of suggestions as to 
TCs might be measured, including the number of reports, missions, meetings, separate (as 
opposed to collective across all donors) legal instruments, separate audit requirements, 
and ultimately whole staff members, particularly sector specialists, who would become 
surplus to requirements through a shift to Budget Support.   
 
It does appear that there are some entire jobs which are largely about administrative 
transaction costs.  On the DP side, one officer estimated her time was more than 80% 
spent in liaison and networking to promote donor harmonisation and establishing 
common ground over sectoral issues.  In another agency, sector level staff priorities have 
been established as being information gathering, synthesising and sharing, largely 
through all the sector meetings, second only to urgent demands for information from HQ.   
The added value of all these meetings in terms of aid effectiveness is not being assessed, 
except by default – that the shift towards sector or budget support would mean that some 
of these posts become redundant.   
 
There are also some government officers whose jobs appear to be largely a transaction 
cost.  They work as a buffer, mediating between mainstream business of running the 
ministry, and ensuring that donor requirements are met, so that financial support 
continues to flow.  One such officer referred to the number of meetings which are ‘not 
government meetings’, and whilst regretting the time they take, referred to them as ‘the 
cost of poverty’.  In line with stated government preference, he advocated greater use of 
budget support, but was clear also that the need was to keep as many donors in support as 
possible.  With a large financing gap on the national budget in the absence of heavy 
donor support, the need is to maximise whatever support is available in whatever form it 
comes.   
 
4 4. .. .3 3      T Ty yi in ng g   C Co os st ts s   
Tying costs are not being addressed explicitly in this paper, since they are negligible in 
comparison to the other TCs.  Apparently the issue of tying was raised around textbook 
procurement for the forthcoming SEDP, but it was shelved in favour of the ordinary 
government tendering mechanism.  Textbooks for primary education are procured at local 
government or school level, as are materials for school construction.  The scope and scale 
of TCs, should not blind us to the advantages of not having to contend with formally tied 
aid.   
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However, there still remains the issue of choice of consultants.  Whilst not formally tied, 
there is an issue in that capacity for PER and PETS work, of a standard acceptable to 
donors, is higher in outside Tanzania rather than in local institutions – not least since 
these instruments were developed outside Tanzania.  There is frequently some jockeying 
amongst donors over the choice of preferred consultant, and decision making over choice 
of consultants then frequently adds to administrative TCs discussing selection criteria, 
and subsequently ensuring that the report is of a standard acceptable to all.   
 
4 4. .4 4      F Fi is sc ca al l   C Co os st ts s   
These are the costs relating to financial flows and aid modalities.  Funding comes through 
four different modalities: 
¾  Project support including the following areas:  teacher education, classroom 
construction, school mapping. 
¾  Pooled Fund support to PEDP 
¾  Sector Support to the primary education sub-sector (PEDP) 
¾  Budget Support to Government of Tanzania.   
 
In what follows, the administrative and fiscal costs of the different modalities are 
considered together, since as will be demonstrated below in the context of pooled fund 
support to the education sector, where the administrative (planning and reporting) 
requirements are too high, this has an impact on fiscal costs in terms of level and 
predictability of funding.   
   
5 5. .      P Pr ro oj je ec ct ts s   
 
One of the major reasons given for a shift towards a sector wide approach was that the 
high number of projects within MOEC was creating in effect a parallel structure of TA 
outside the mainstream government budgeting, decision making and administration 
structures.  One of the largest of these projects was the huge District Based Support to 
Primary Education (DBSPE) which at its height worked in over 70 of Tanzania’s 120 + 
districts.  The decision was made in 2000 that all projects should be mainstreamed partly 
in order that more resources should be captured within the main government budget.  
This has to some extent been achieved, and very large projects like DBSPE have slowly 
been wound down.   
 
However, even now, there are an estimated 110 projects still on the books, with an 
average size of $906,000
12.  New projects are also being talked about, for ICT and special 
needs education, even from LMG donors who are supposedly those most committed to 
moving towards budget support.  Some of these plans are in response to direct requests 
from government for project support, which tends to imply also that MOEC ownership of 
the sector wide approach concept is not strong.   
 
                                                 
12 Mapping Exercise of Interventions of the Likeminded Development Partners in the Context of the  
Tanzania Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS), Commissioned by the Embassy of Ireland (on behalf of the LM 
Group) Dar es Salaam, October 2004.   
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A major sticking point in the shift away from project support is the position of the smaller 
contributors – they feel that their distinctive voice will be lost in the context of a larger 
and more comprehensive contribution to Government of Tanzania, and that the best way 
to maintain their individual ‘leverage’ is through projects.  Quite what they want to 
achieve through this individual leverage is not articulated, beyond general references to 
‘sector dialogue’.   The danger is that this wish for ‘dialogue’ too easily becomes the use 
of dialogue to press pet concerns, and puts donors into the position of being lobbyists for 
a particular issue, or using technical advice as de facto conditionality, since the dialogue 
is so closely tied to provision of funding.   Insufficient attention is often given as to why 
those concerns – are not coming up through local institutions, and how far pursuing these 
concerns could be blocking genuine Tanzanian ownership of the education and other 
reforms. 
 
Some bilateral agencies who are seeking to move strongly away from project support, are 
not actually in a position to know if their government is supporting projects in a sector, as 
they come through a different arm of government, or even from their domestic line 
ministries.  This all creates a confusing picture for recipient governments when the 
rhetoric of reducing projects does not add up to the reality of what is being supported.   
 
Projects are not in themselves the problem.  It is when they create ‘perverse incentives’ 
that there are difficulties.  These incentives can be at the level of TTCs – toys 
(computers), trips overseas, and cars, to enhance commitment to the success of the 
project, or they can be that it is easier to approach a donor for project funding than to go 
to the Ministry of Finance to argue the case for prioritization of funding for a particular 
sub-sectoral concern.  As an indication that they are not in themselves a problem, the 
Ministry of Finance is reportedly interested in financing an initiative to fund Marie 
Stopes Clinics – which have demonstrable benefits for pregnant women living in remote 
rural areas, through the national budget.   
 
Moving away from project support can also mean moving away from area based 
programmes, which had the benefit of enabling donors to get a better perspective on the 
impact of programme and reform implementation from outside Dar and outside their own 
sectoral area of interest  
 
Despite the transaction costs that exist with these projects, no one interviewed 
volunteered information or identified projects as problems, except in so far as some 
agency’s wish for them is seen as an obstacle to achieving the greater gains in terms of 
poverty reduction arguably obtainable through budget support.   
 
Looking beyond the confines of the sector, one of the most controversial of the ‘projects’, 
is the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF).  ‘TASAF activities are designed to 
improve basic social and economic services and protect vulnerable groups, including 
young children, while the positive impact of the ongoing structural adjustment and 
administrative reforms take hold’
13.  Run out of an office in the heart of Dar es Salaam, 
close to the Prime Minister’s Office and the State House, TASAF is defined on the World 
                                                 
13 http://www.worldbank.org/afr/tz/tasaf.htm 15
th November 2004.   Final version 
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Bank website as a ‘community based development initiative’ with numerous ‘sub-
projects’
14.  Activities include the construction of 1,888 classrooms, 481 teacher houses, 
277 modern school latrines.  It is mentioned here not primarily out of concern with 
transaction costs it may or may not generate - the President himself has warmly endorsed 
TASAF activities, not least because of a reported 87% of project funds going to 
beneficiaries with very low costs in administration - but the fact that the way it operates 
seems to be inconsistent with other on-going reforms, including over decentralisation and 
public sector finance.  It causes frustration in some government quarters because of this.  
Despite the Bank’s own initiatives to promote public sector financial reform, TASAF 
expenditures are not captured in the national budget.  MOEC officials are completely in 
ignorance of their planned expenditure, and sometimes so also are district level officials.  
Arguably this is naturally the case, since the planned activities are identified at grassroots 
level, but the scale of the operations and the lack of clarity as to how they coordinate 
even with district level plans, led one central government interviewee to comment with 
disappointment on the ‘obvious duplication of efforts’.  
   
   
6 6. .      P Po oo ol le ed d   F Fu un nd d   a an nd d   S Se ec ct to or r   S Su up pp po or rt t   t to o   P PE ED DP P   
6 6. .1 1      A Ad dm mi in ni is st tr ra at ti iv ve e   A Ar rr ra an ng ge em me en nt ts s   a an nd d   C Co os st ts s   
 
Pooled Fund and Sector Support to PEDP are different, but they are being considered 
together as they both support PEDP directly, and have related administrative TCs since 
the decision making structure within MOEC and PO-RALG
15 connects them both.  
Ironically, whilst the intention was that PEDP would be the primary sub-sector 
component of a sector wide approach
16, one of the most frequent criticisms it comes 
under is that it is in fact a ‘giant project’.  In the budget the PEDP is identified as a 
project (number 4321). ‘The use of the word ‘project’ in the budget may be unfortunate 
terminology by the government, nevertheless, from interviews with government officials, 
it is clear that the Government perceives PEDP as having become a ‘project’ because 
they feel it is micro-managed and controlled by the donors.’
17 
 
                                                 
14 ibid 
15 The ministry responsible for the administration of education at local level. 
16 It is further ironic that donors can being wrapped over the knuckles about the following terminological 
distinctions, when many of their partners, have not internalised its basic premises:  ‘A SWAP has various 
characteristics, as defined above, which include Government ownership of a programme; increased 
coherence between policy, spending and results; and reduced transaction costs.  These characteristics may 
be applied to a sub-sector and in the TOR for this evaluation it is stated that a sector wide approach is 
applied to PEDP.  However, applying the comprehensive characteristics of the sector wide approach to a 
sub-sector is not the same as a comprehensive approach to a sector as a whole.  Sector Wide Approach 
means comprehensive planning for the whole sector (sometimes written as SWAp which refers to the 
process); by extension a comprehensive approach to planning a sub-sector is also (misleadingly) called a 
SWAp. (SWAp should be distinguished from SWAP which is a Sector Wide Approach Programme).  
Although a SWAp has been applied to PEDP and it has been comprehensively planned as a sub-sector, 
PEDP lacks linkages to secondary education and the rest of the sector. It is therefore incorrect to say PEDP 
is a coherent part of a SWAP.’  European Delegation op cit page 31 
17 ibid page 15.  Final version 
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The decision making structure, involves the following committees.  The key one is the 
Basic Education Development Committee (BEDC), which is supposed to be chaired 
alternately by the Permanent Secretary (PS) of MOEC and the PS of PO-RALG, as the 
main two stakeholder ministries.  All donors are represented in BEDC, as are other 
stakeholders including NGOs.  BEDC is supposedly supported by the following technical 
working groups (TWGs), each chaired by a Director: 
¾  Enrolment expansion – making recommendations as to what needs to be done to 
increase net and gross enrolment, reach out through non-formal education and so 
on 
¾  Quality improvement – recommendations about actions to improve the quality of 
education 
¾  Institutional Arrangements – responsibility for effectiveness of working relations 
between the two key ministries and all the levels of administration from school, 
through district to national level 
¾  Resource Allocation, Cost Effectiveness and Funding (RACEF), which is also the 
education sector public expenditure review (PER) TWG 
¾  Cross-cutting issues: primarily focussing on gender, environment and HIV/AIDS 
The work of BEDC is streamlined through a body called the Task Force, which serves as 
a clearing house to ensure that matters can be dealt with in the much larger BEDC 
quickly and efficiently.   
 
Despite its apparent logic, this structure is dysfunctional.  Not one interviewee was found 
who spoke in its favour.  Donors complained of lack of senior enough representation at 
the meetings of BEDC, despite it being for them their main forum of engagement.  
Government complained of too many meetings ‘which are not government meetings’
18.  
NGOs complained that ‘real decisions’ were made elsewhere than through this structure, 
which defeated the point of attending.  No one is happy, and it is apparent that the 
administrative TCs of working in this way are very high.  Neither, however, is there 
much real movement to change the administrative structure, as it has been laid out in the 
original PEDP document which, project-like, is due to come to an end in 2006.   
 
Part of the reason for this structure, is to carry out business which is required under either 
the Pooled Fund Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
19 or other work such as the 
PER.  This work involves mainly planning and reporting:   
¾  Quarterly and annual progress reports – giving quantitative and qualitative data on 
progress of activities identified in work plans 
¾  Financial monitoring on a quarterly basis – funds expended against activities and 
outcomes.  The transfer of funds for each item is reported against the budget 
amount.  There is a time lag of one quarter to allow data to be collected and 
processed 
                                                 
18 These complaints are rooted in the same problem – since the meetings are not mainstream business for 
government, deputies are frequently sent to meetings.  Since they are often not well briefed, they often do 
not speak out at the meeting, which leaves donor frustration that the meetings are not ‘moving things 
forward’.    
19 The Pooled Fund involves 9 donors and is governed by an MoU which was signed by the original 5 
partners in 2001.   Final version 
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¾  Annual audit – with provision being made for this to be by an international firm, 
rather than the government’s own auditors 
¾  Financial tracking – the first PETS study was carried out in 2004, involving 
tracking funds through MOEC, PO-RALG and MoF.   
 
These activities are now widely regarded as highly problematic for three reasons: 
¾  They constitute a parallel process 
¾  They are not feasible to carry out 
¾  The purpose and use to which the various documents are put.   
 
The parallel process comes from the fact that these planning and reporting processes 
duplicate government ones. One donor sector specialist noted that after having spent 
hours trying to connect PEDP activities with government votes and subvotes, it became 
apparent that MOEC had provided data to MoF in high level of detail, including GSF 
codes and in line with MTEF, but that this information was not the same as the 
information given to donors, leaving them confused and angry.  It appeared were 2 sets of 
plans and budgets in circulation serving different needs.  Auditing is another parallel 
process which causes frustration this time to government.  Government auditors are 
generally respected and responding to their queries is a priority.  Having to respond to 
another set of queries, this time from Deloitte and Touche, doubles the work load, and 
does not necessarily have any linkages back into strengthening government systems.   
 
It is now generally agreed that the demands of all these activities on a quarterly basis is 
unrealistic – not least Tanzania is a very large country, and building up a picture of work 
plans from the operational level (more than 12,000 schools, some in remote rural areas, 
reporting to district offices where there are no computers) is not feasible.  There was 
some feeling that it was not realistic, even when the MoU was signed, but it went through 
nonetheless, and some donor sector specialists have been trying to stick to the letter of the 
agreement ever since, which is a cause of on-going friction.   
 
Another source of friction is differences of opinion about the quality of the reports, their 
purpose and the use to which they are put.  It would appear that rather than seeing reports 
as the basis for making changes in future plans and priorities on the base of past 
performance, which is what the donors expect, government has tended to see the 
production of the report as an end in itself, and little or no subsequent action is taken.  For 
example 2004 Review is peppered with comments about the situation not having changed 
since the review the previous year, which was carried out by the same lead consultants.   
On the other hand, it is also reasonable to take the view that the annual review for 
example, can only sample a small number of districts, and that rather than act on the basis 
of a small sample, it is better to cross check against more systematic data coming through 
government’s own feedback mechanisms, and act on the basis of that.  Whilst this may be 
a positive example of government sensibly relying on more systematic data sources, it 
leaves frustration on the part of donors that their efforts, which are in line with the legally 
sanctioned MoU, are being visibly marginalized.  The perception is also that neither is 
there comparable effort on the part of government to build capacity to improve Final version 
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government’s own reporting mechanisms so that they contribute more to results based 
management.   
 
Disagreements between Pooled Fund Partners (PFP) and the World Bank have also 
diverted attention away from a focus on achieving sustainable and predictable financial 
flows, let alone promoting local accountability.  Relations between the PFP and the 
World Bank education specialist have ranged between cool and hostile, with suspicion on 
the part of the PFPs that the Bank has encouraged MOEC to see the pooled fund in a very 
poor light, fomenting some of the frustration with the demands of the MoU, and apparent 
lack of willingness to carry it out.  There is a sense in MOEC that meeting ‘prior actions’ 
agreed as part of the loan agreement is easier than trying to meet changing and 
undocumented PFP expectations, over for example the quality of a particular report, and 
expectations of its follow up.   
 
The underlying problem with these dysfunctional structures and mechanisms is that it is 
hard to construct them as part of an ultimately benign spectrum where meetings and 
reports blend into genuine dialogue and partnership towards a common goal.  Through 
the goodwill and hard work of particular individuals, enough has been done to keep the 
‘partnership’ from complete collapse, and hence financial flows from drying up.  As will 
be described below, however, the demands of reports and meetings have had a negative 
effect on the predictability of financial flows.  Just reducing the number of meetings or 
reports, or shifting to budget support, may reduce the frustration of individual 
government or donor officials, but it will not substantially increase the effectiveness of 
aid, because of the underlying fiscal and other problems that risk being untouched.   
 
6 6. .2 2   F Fi is sc ca al l   c co os st ts s         
6.2.1  Unpredictability of Financial Flows - Quantity 
Releases from both sector support and pooled fund have been consistently problematic 
and dogged with uncertainty.   
 
The sector support is a loan from the World Bank; once government has fulfilled the 
‘prior actions’ laid out in the loan agreement, tranches of funds are released directly to 
exchequer.  According to the 2004 PEDP Review, the sector support tranche due by June 
2004, still had not been received as of October.  The following IDA flows are recorded:   
 
Institution   Year 2002/03  Year 2003/04  Year 2004/05 
  Budget   Actual   Budget Actual  Budget   
 Tshs. 
Billions  




Tshs.    
IDA   48.1  55.95  87.23  56.3  26.09   
Source: PEDP Review 2004, quoting MOEC/PORALG records  
 
The Pooled Fund arrangement has two phases of releasing funding into the government 
financial system.  The first involves individual donors releasing funds into a Holding Final version 
 
  14
Account on the basis of conditions stipulated in the MoU and individual cooperation 
agreements with the government of Tanzania.  The second phase involves release of 
funds from the holding account into treasury, after all partners are agreed that that the 
MoU conditions – audits, reports and so on described above -  have been met.   
In the words of the review:  ‘The pooled fund manifests characteristics of uncertainty on 
both issues of release of funds to the holding account and clearing of funds to the 
exchequer account. The pattern observed in year 2002/03 is repeated in year 2003/04. 
Apart from there being no regular release of funds on a quarterly basis, the release of 
funds available did not observe quarterly needs.’
20  The release of funds to exchequer 
bears little relationship to how much funding there is in the holding account, as shown in 
the table below.  When more is approved or endorsed than is actually in the account, it 
adds to frustration on the part of government, that they are being asked to bear heavy 
transaction costs for insufficient benefit
21.   
 
Table 1: Comparison of amount approved by Pooled Fund Partners with Holding 
Account balance 
 
2002/2003 2003/2004  Dates 
October May  February   April  August 
Balance in Holding 
Account  
12,202,003 18,661,085  13,041,646  29,034,814   
Balance approved by 
BEDC 
12,524,400 128,071,738
22 81,478,357  122,744,188   
Amount endorsed by 
PFP  
12,524,400 49,005,665  50,  702,076 (Approval  in 
August)  
11,430,100 
Sources: (i). Balance in holding account according to MOF data  
  (ii). BEDC and PFP according to information compiled by Secretariat 
(Coordinator’s office). 
 
When this is translated into actual quarterly disbursements, the following is the picture 
for 2003/4.  In the past there have been no disbursement for some quarters due to poor 
audit reports.   
 
Figure 1: Releases of funds by Donors
23  
                                                 
20 MOEC (2004)  op cit page 14.   
21 Because of problems with when PFPs put funding into the account, they do sometimes approve more for 
withdrawal than is actually there.  This results in government having to withdraw what is available at 
different times.  On one occasion, more was withdrawn than had been authorised – and this was publicly 
apologised for.  This has resulted in PFPs now requiring to see actual bank statements to check on levels in 
the account – an indication of how far micro-management and lack of trust can take you.   
22 Even if one were to take into consideration the expected release from IDA amounting to some US $  
55.95 million whose credit in the holding account took in place in June 2003, still the amount approved is 
far larger than the expected balance.  
23 MOEC (2004)  op cit page 15.   Final version 
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This is then also mirrored by disbursements from central government, showing the 
distorting effect of delays is disbursement from the pooled fund.   
 
Figure 2: Levels and patterns of actual spending on PEDP in 2003/04 












































6.2.2  Unpredictability of Financial Flows – targeting 
The emphasis on the 2003/4 was on improving quality in PEDP. Plans and budgets were 
drawn up to reflect this, but the Annual Review notes that whilst emphasis in terms of 
planning was put on quality enhancement, in terms of disbursement there has been little 
deviation from previous spending patterns.   Final version 
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6.2.3  Results of Unpredictability 
The result of these problems is that the timing and level of disbursements bears little 
relationship to plans prepared by the end users – ‘unpredictability of funding flows, 
irregular timing of disbursements and uncertainties over the levels of funding are leaving 
schools, teachers colleges and Council officials asking why they should plan when they 
have no control over these areas’
24.  This risks undermining the thrust not only of PEDP 
but of other reforms which have the potential to immensely improve service delivery, 
including fiscal decentralisation and local government reform.   
 
6.2.4  Explanations and the Development of a Vicious Circle 
 
The administrative structure of TWGs, BEDC and Task Force has not been 
effective in ensuring the timely and targeted use of PEDP resources.  On the contrary, 
it is arguable that the energies of key government officers taken up in meetings ‘which 
are not government meetings’, may actually have delayed the process.   For the current 
year, one PFP official noted spending about 15 hours making alterations to the PEDP 
budget to ensure it was in line with plans approved by BEDC, and finding it impossible 
to get consistency between the various figures in circulation.  A government official 
independently expressed frustration over the same exercise, seeing it largely as a paper 
one, just to keep the PFP happy.  Where proponents of one instrument (sector support) 
have been undermining support for the pooled fund, this seems to have contributed to 
worsening relations and to an avoidance of the key issues.   
 
Lines of communication have not been open towards solving problems:  Despite the 
MoU requirements that GoT and PFP would work together in a spirit of openness, 
transparency and consultation, this has not characterised their relationships around annual 
planning and budgeting.  PFP sector specialists have sought ways to resolve the problem.  
One has been to complain to the PS MoF through the PER structures about how MOEC is 
not keeping to timetable or apparently seeing the point of, for example, the PER.  This 
has had little success, as MoF is not able to discipline line ministries in this way – such 
an initiative would have to come through the Prime Minister’s Office.  It also reveals the 
lack of understanding by some DPs of government processes.  They have also raised the 
issue with their own Heads of Aid, and in recent weeks there has been the first of what is 
anticipated as being a series of meetings with the Minister of Education and Culture, to 
try and open doors towards a better understanding.  It is too early to say what the 
outcome of such ‘dialogue’ will be.  However, the interest and focus of many of the 
Heads of Aid is now on shifting to budget support, with a consequent down-grading of 
interest in the details of problematic sector dialogue.   
 
Sight of the bigger picture is lost:  Partly because of the lack of means of solving 
problems, discussions between government and donors tend to fix on whether or not a 
particular report has been produced in line with the MoU, rather than the more 
                                                 
24 Ibid page vi.   Final version 
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substantive point of ensuring that funds are available and are disbursed in line with plans, 
so that the vision of decentralised local management of education is achieved.   
 
In the mutual frustration, it is harder still to get at the deeper lying issues around capacity.  
Whilst the EU review of pooled fund support regrets that no analysis was done of 
government capacity to deliver the programme, and the annual reviews recommend that 
such a study is carried out, it becomes increasingly difficult to discuss the nature of the 
‘capacity gaps’.  First and foremost it has to be said that these are on all sides.  Not all of 
them related to exposure to and enthusiasm for current reforms – in both DPs and 
government there are challenges with conventional business of supervision and follow-up 
of workplans, and effective division of labour.   Donor weaknesses are apparent in their 
understanding the Tanzanian context, poor institutional memory, and as a group, very 
different levels of understanding of the reform picture outside the education sector.  
However, the capacity gaps which are generally spoken of are those in government, 
which not unnaturally makes for some defensiveness, and hence greater difficulty in 
discussing honestly ways forward.  Again, current arrangements have achieved little in 
trying to address these problems, despite the fact that they are at the heart of aid 
effectiveness.   
 
Part of the bigger picture is also the numerous other reforms that are going on 
simultaneously with PEDP implementation.  Some are better embedded and owned than 
others, and government is not monolithic – so some ministries have more to gain than 
others, and so have some individual officers.  For example: 
¾  Public sector financial reforms enhance the power of MoF over line ministries – 
who can no longer negotiate a loan directly, but only via MoF; budgeting in order 
to achieve specific poverty focussed outputs, as opposed to traditional 
‘incremental budgeting’, risks opposition from those who cannot demonstrate 
how their particular post contributes to that outcome.  This relates to - 
¾  Civil Service reform is threatening to those who for whom government service, 
whatever its disadvantages of relatively low pay, offered at least the benefit of 
long term security;  
¾  Local government reform and decentralisation diminishes the authority of the 
traditional high spending line ministries like education.   
 
The 2004 Review documents substantive problems that exist between MOEC and PO-
RALG
25.   These derive from the division of responsibility of the two ministries, with 
PO-RALG having responsibility for ensuring that schools are run efficiently and 
resources used appropriately and MOEC giving direction on issues of quality, educational 
standards, curriculum and teacher training.  Problems exist in that MOEC still transfers 
money directly to schools, contrary to government circular no 1 of 1998 which says that 
sector ministries should communicate with councils only via PO-RALG.  There are also 
anomalies in the position of the District Education Officer, who is accountable to MOEC, 
rather than the District Executive Director, unlike other members of the management 
team at district level.  Legislative amendment is believed to be underway, but the revised 
bill not yet made public.  Relations between MOEC and PO-RALG are strained over 
                                                 
25 MOEC (2004) page 7-8   Final version 
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funding issues, and the perception that MOEC is unwilling to relinquish its former hold 
over every aspect of education from the classroom to the central ministry.  The Review 
report is peppered with comments indicating the lack of progress on issues of relations 
between PO-RALG and MOEC, with explanations of the implications of this lack of 
progress.   
 
Neither the MoU nor World Bank sector support has been an effective instrument to 
expedite progress towards these changes.  Frustration of DPs leading them to push 
towards more BS without Government resolving, and then enforcing, through legislation 
the division of labour between MOEC and PO-RALG could compound the problem. 
 
Proponents of either instrument, have given very little attention to ensuring the 
sustainability of gains made, or to promoting local accountability.  The fact of NGO 
participation in the various TWGs and committees, as well as review processes, has been 
taken by some to be sufficient, with little attention given to how to institutionalise that 
accountability through local structures, whether at national or local level.  There is a 
DP/Government ‘Governance Working Group’, which is currently starting to look at ‘the 
demand side of accountability’, but it is composed of governance specialists, and 
educationalists are not in effective communication with them.   
 
6.2.5  Conclusion 
The substantive points from this discussion of pooled fund and sector support are that: 
¾  Transaction costs, administrative and fiscal, around support to PEDP have been 
substantial 
¾  Attention focussed on ensuring adherence to the MoU, might have been better 
spent on creating an enabling environment for some of the other issues, such as 
identifying and setting out to systematically address capacity gaps, or improving 
relations between MOEC and PO-RALG, including their legal basis, or promoting 
local accountability, all of which might have had a better long term impact on 
poverty reduction.   
  
 
7.  Budget Support 
 
Development Assistance through budget support currently amounts to $451,200,000.  
DfID is the major donor to BS  rather than education sector support. They are still 
involved, in so far as it exists, in sector dialogue.   
 
7 7. .1 1      G Gr ro ow wi in ng g   E En nt th hu us si ia as sm m   f fo or r   B Bu ud dg ge et t   S Su up pp po or rt t   
Government is increasingly enthusiastic about moves towards budget support. In the 
words of the just retired PS of MOEC: 
‘The Basket-Funding and/or Pooled Funding arrangement is regarded as an 
interim measure towards the budget support. We regard this as an interim 
measure because it is an indication of mutual understanding among the 
development partners to manage their resources collectively but outside the Final version 
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Government budget management system. This approach though better than the 
project financing approach, causes a lot of stress in Government because the 
same is forced to have two parallel finance management systems. The pooled 
funding approach is also an indication of reluctance or lack of faith on the 
Government finance management system. Although it is never openly expressed 
so by the development partners, one is inclined to believe so otherwise the 
solution would have been to go budget support. On the other hand this financing 
arrangement is an indicator that the donor Governments have not fully reformed 
their financing policies to go fully into budget support’
26 
 
Budget support would do a great deal to ensure predictability of aid flows, and more 
control by GoT, than the problems discussed in detail above about the pooled fund.   
 
Donors are also increasingly enthusiastic about it, particularly in the context of the 
newly launched ‘second generation’ PRS, the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction – known as ‘Mkukuta’ - and work towards the development of a Joint 
Assistance Strategy.  Tanzania is leading the world in terms of harmonization, as the 
November 2004 conference in Dar es Salaam showed, and there are high hopes, for 
example within DfID of achieving Millenium Development Goals through channeling 
significantly higher levels of funding through BS.   
 
7 7. .2 2      L Li ik ke el ly y   I Im mp pl li ic ca at ti io on ns s   f fo or r   T Tr ra an ns sa ac ct ti io on n   C Co os st ts s   
 
Time and again the rhetoric of reduced transaction costs is used.  It is frequently argued 
that the initial coordination costs will be high, but that relatively soon it will be possible 
to see gains in terms of fewer missions, meetings, reports and the ‘sending home of some 
sector technical assistants’, because of the increased use of ‘silent partnerships’ and 
withdrawal from some sectors.  However, even with the technical issue of transaction 
costs, initial signs are not particularly good.  The current review of Poverty Reduction 
Budgetary Support, notes shifts towards a higher administrative burden on MoF 
‘although this reflects a deeper involvement in reform processes, as well as a more 
extensive dialogue with development partners’
27.   
 
This point is key.  Much as government would wish to see more flexible financing and 
much as some donors appreciate that MDGs cannot be met out of the current levels of 
project and sector funding, they are not going to write a cheque and walk away.  There is 
the firm belief that funding alone is not sufficient and that a whole raft of reforms is 
necessary to ensure that it is used appropriately.  These include the various sector reform 
programmes, financial reform, legal reform, local government reform, civil service 
reform, amongst many others, as well as the overarching Poverty Reduction Strategy.  All 
                                                 
26 Making Services Work for Poor People Modes of Financing: The Tanzanian Experience. M J Malale 
Permanent Secretary (extract from a paper presented at Making Services Work for poor people Workshop 
Berlin July 2002) 
27 Daima Associates and ODI (2004) Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support, Tanzania 1995-2004, 
Phase 2 Report: Preliminary Assessment of Efficiency and Effectiveness of Budget Support and 
Recommendations for Improvements; Report to GoT and the PRBS Partners, page 37 Final version 
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of these require donor engagement and dialogue to ensure that they happen, and happen 
in the way that donors envisage – subject always to dialogue.  What is envisaged in terms 
of Mkukuta for example, is that rather than the priority sectors of the first PRS, there are 
now priority poverty focussed outputs, many of which are cross sectoral, so that instead 
of the monthly and time consuming DP sector group meetings, there will be informal and 
ad hoc groups meeting to contribute to ensuring outputs are met.  An optimist would 
anticipate that this could mean fewer meetings, but it must not be forgotten that the 
projects and the sector support and pooled fund are still on-going, so that whilst an 
individual donor opting for budget support may be attending fewer meetings, it is by no 
means clear that this would be the case for government
28.   
 
Similarly, it is more plausible to think in terms of shifting costs rather than reducing 
them.  Donors want  sustained ‘high level dialogue’, as opposed to what they see as the 
on-going meetings with lower, more technical level officials without real decision 
making power, which add to donor TCs, without little benefit from their perspective.  
Donor sector specialists who are retained are expected to spend more time ‘in the field’ – 
at least a week a month was quoted by one interviewee -  seeing first hand the real impact 
of the reforms, rather than locked in meetings in Dar es Salaam.  It is only to be 
anticipated that they will seek to feed their findings through into government processes, 
however.  This to the pessimist looks like shifting and changing the meetings rather than 
necessarily reducing them.  The problem with thinking in terms of raising the level of 
sector dialogue to, say PS level, is that the numbers of people who really have an 
overview of all the various reforms, strategies, instruments and so on is very few – and 
there is a risk that expecting these officers also to be taking a bigger share of the donor 
dialogue will either (a) be disappointed or (b) have an opportunity cost of delaying the 
deepening and enhanced GOT ownership of those very processes.   
 
Donors appreciate that risks are involved in higher levels of budget support – hence in 
general terms the wide range of reforms being supported.  More specifically, risks are 
seen in terms of loss of control by donors, and hence potential domestic damage should 
‘something go wrong’.  Particular fears are the absence of free and fair elections in 2005, 
or the eruption of a major corruption scandal that would embarrass a donor government 
whose domestic constituency is already concerned about the wealth of some leaders of 
impoverished African countries.  Both of these issues would tend to imply a great deal of 
work is necessary to promote local accountability within Tanzania, on the basis that both 
are, at root, matters of good governance.  Improved governance is more likely to come in 
response to sustained demand over time, rather than as a spill over from years of 
accounting for donor money.  As has been mentioned above, however, there has been 
little thinking about how to work on this point in the education sector.  Indeed some of 
the demands for accountability to donors under the pooled fund mechanism may have 
actually stood in its way, by distracting attention from the issue.     
 
Some donor moves towards budget support are combined with the hard-headed line that 
development aid is a decreasing priority for the domestic constituency of donor 
                                                 
28 Enthusiasts for Budget Support have even recommended that TAS should set a limit to the use of project 
funding, Daima Associates op cit, page 49.    Final version 
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countries, and hence that there is less pressure to spend than in the past.  For some 
donors, the cost of peace-keeping operations is covered out of the aid budget, and with 
an eye on their domestic audience some development ministers are looking for high 
profile wins through this route, rather than through long term development assistance 
… in other words more money could be made available more flexibly, but some donors 
at least are not desperate to spend and are happy to walk away.  This would be an 
optimistic scenario, from the point of some observers, who see a stronger risk of 
collusion between government and the donor community in ignoring corruption 





In short, whilst opportunities are opened up by Budget Support, it is critical that a shift in 
this direction is not taken on the rebound from unsatisfactory relations at sector level.  
Development issues in a particular sector will not go away just because they drop below 
the DPs radar.  Similar challenges around leadership, prioritization, communication, 
capacity and so on, will also be present in the areas of focus which Budget Support would 
lead DPs to focus on.   
 
 
8 8. .      W Wa ay ys s   f fo or rw wa ar rd d   
 
This long description of issues and challenges around aid effectiveness in the education 
sector, begs the question of what is to be done.   
 
In fact, much of this is already well documented – in for example, the OECD DAC ‘Good 
Practice Note on Providing Support to Sector Programmes’
30 – and do not need repeating 
at length.  Guiding principles are laid out: support government ownership and leadership, 
work with government to strengthen institutional capacity, take a long term strategic 
view, set the sector programme in context to achieve coherence with other programmes, 
be pragmatic and flexible and so on
31.  ‘Essential factors’ are also noted: leadership at 
sector level, commitment to the process elsewhere in government, broad consensus 
between government and donors on key policy and management issues, reasonable 
degree of macro-economic and political stability, as well as ‘facilitating factors’ many of 
which are in place.  The desirability of all of these is not in doubt.   
 
The issue is around the judgement calls, such as was/is there sufficient consensus 
between government and donors on key management issues.  Given the current 
dissatisfactions, it would be easy to be negative.  However, this is with the benefit of 
hindsight.  In the view of many who signed the pooled fund MoU in 2001, it was good 
enough.  Certainly from the point of view of government, it was ‘as good as could be 
achieved at the time’ – more flexibility given to government over for example audit 
                                                 
29 See for example, Brian Cooksey (2003) Aid and Corruption:  A Worm’s-Eye View  of Donor Policies 
and Practices, paper presented to the 11
th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Seoul, 
30 Draft of 13 October 2004, still being finalised.   
31 Ibid page 4 Final version 
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arrangements would have meant that some DPs could not have signed.  In the context of 
current frustrations, this is often forgotten.  It leads to the key recommendation for both 
government and donors: 
 
8 8. .1 1      F Fo or r   G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   a an nd d   D De ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   P Pa ar rt tn ne er rs s: :   C Co om me e   t to o   a a   C Co om mm mo on n   
U Un nd de er rs st ta an nd di in ng g      
 
A great deal of work needs to be done to generate relationships when it is possible to be 
open about needs and priorities; and to raise the same concerns in formal meetings as in 
informal groupings.  The magnitude of this challenge is not to be underestimated: it has 
to be set in the context of a long history of domination, and very unequal power relations.  
The years of the independence struggle are still very much within the memory of many 
government officers – not so the often much younger expatriate sector specialists; a 
strategic focus on reform is a luxury, when the strongest domestic demand is for ‘more of 
the same’ – more schools, textbooks etc, so that government has to prioritise meeting its 
practical financial needs.  If a way to achieve these is to agree to proposed reform 
agendas, so be it, and it cannot be doubted that various key people in powerful positions 
have embraced them fully and for their own merits.  But this does not imply that every 
government officer has the same enthusiasm – either for reasons of lack of exposure to 
what could be achieved by the reform, or to the technical side of how to implement it, or 
because of a natural caution that the reform will actually make a difference – a point with 
particular resonance for those with extended family members still living in poverty in 
rural areas - or that the extra demands of the reform process will be sufficiently 
personally worthwhile, since they are in addition to existing workloads, not the core of 
them. 
 
Set against this background the following diagram tries to contextualise TCs in the bigger 
picture of government / donor relations.  Points further to the left or right of the diagram 
will have the strongest negative or positive impact.  Those near the centre could have an 
impact in either direction.  For example, donor dependency in the budget risks being 
negative, but short term dependence on foreign funding is not half so damaging in the 
long run as the mental attitude that donor funding is the way forward indefinitely.  Many 
more issues could be added, but these were the prime ones which came up in the course 











Some terminologies need explaining:  Capacity building is understood as a more limited 
exercise than capacity development.  Capacity building can orient a staff member to use 
of a computer or to PETS methodologies, so that they are able to do something they were 
not able to do before.  Capacity development is more open ended, and concerns the use 
to which a particular skill is put – taking a tool and using it imaginatively and 
constructively towards a desired end.  Many government officers, for example in MOEC, 
lack exposure to new methodologies and ideas, but they are deeply rooted in the school 
systems they have been administering.  Freeing up their common sense view of what is 
feasible, and what capacity building and development needs to take place to enable it to 
happen is an important way forward in deepening ownership of PEDP, especially in the 
context of a broader national debate about the role of education in national 
development
32.  Workshops are a necessary means of communicating understanding for 
issues which cannot be covered by a government circular.  However, their ad hoc use for 
capacity building, without a coherent strategy of capacity building needs, risks further 
distortions, including prioritization of the importance of a workshop by the per diems 
available, and the mindset of personal gain of core government business.   
 
DPs increasingly make a distinction between government and national ownership, as 
part of their concern that a change in government should not lead to a change in policy 
                                                 
32 The issues of private schooling and English language teaching are concerns to many ‘average’ 
Tanzanians but they do not figure highly in ‘sector dialogue’, despite their importance to national 
development.  See for example, Maarifa ni Ufunguo (2003) ‘Private Primary and Pre-Primary Schooling in 
Tanzania’s Education System: Evidence from Arusha and Kilimanjaro’ 
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that there has been so much, not least in transaction costs, to generate.  There needs to be 
a stronger sense of what local accountability can look like in the context of Tanzania in 
the early years of the 21
st century, and how it can be generated.  Some support to some 
CSOs to encourage a ‘watchdog’ and ‘challenge’ role is not necessarily appropriate, and 
risks generating the opposite of what it is designed to achieve.  ‘Business as usual’ 
mentality refers to a risk avoidance approach – on the part of both donors and 
government - which sees every emerging opportunity as just a phase to be lived through, 
rather than assessing it honestly on its merits and seeing how it can contribute to positive 
change.   
 
What this diagram tries to illustrate is that for many constructive actions, which could 
lead to positive change, there are many possible responses and reactions, and it is 
necessary to invest the time in understanding what is happening.  For example, a high 
number of meetings can be negative by promoting mutual frustration, or they can be part 
of a positive process of developing a real understanding of ways forward.  Donors trying 
to harmonise amongst themselves – for example in producing a collective response to the 
PETS – can be seen positively as reducing transaction costs for government in that they 
are not having themselves to collate comments from more than a dozen DPs, or it can be 
seen negatively as donors ‘ganging up’ on government to tell it what its response should 
be.  Similarly the shift to budget support could be positive in freeing up resources and 
making aid flows more predictable, but tied to reforms for which there is not ownership 
in depth, or which bring additional TCs, could generate disappointment and frustration on 
both sides in the future.   
 
First and foremost the need is for a common understanding of what is happening and 
what could be ways forward.   
 
8 8. .2 2      F Fo or r   D De ev ve el lo op pm me en nt t   P Pa ar rt tn ne er rs s   
8.2.1  Take a Longer Term Tanzania Based Perspective 
There are no quick fixes to poverty and reform.  At the very least, institutional memory 
needs to be built consistently within agencies and between agencies – reports written 
before a particular officer arrived in Tanzania tend to be regarded as of historical interest 
only, whereas for many government officers – and indeed Tanzanians working within DP 
agencies - it is frustrating to see the same issues emerging time and again.  Longer 
postings for expatriate personnel might help in this regard.  With 2-3 year postings, it is 
very possible to become the ‘oldest’ expatriate DP in a DP working group within only a 
few months of arrival. 
 
Many DPs pride themselves on their role in ‘pushing the debate forward’ – indeed very 
often their future careers depend on being able to demonstrate change achieved in the 
short period of time before they move on to another country.  It would help if expatriate 
DPs applied themselves more thoroughly to understanding their Tanzania work context, 
and if their agencies gave them more incentive, for example through professional 
appraisal, to do so.  The problem is that ‘pushing the debate forward’ in practice usually 
involves keeping up more strongly with the debates’ international dimensions than with Final version 
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its local applications.  Often this comes over as ‘continually moving the goal posts’ – 
PER introduced, participatory PER introduced, timing of PER changed to fit better with 
the annual budget cycle – in such a way that no one process is properly embedded, 
understood and owned before it is altered – leaving many middle ranking government 
officers always in a position of trying to keep up.  This they try to do without the benefit 
of much internet access or of Knowledge Management systems to make access to 
relevant information easily available, quite apart from a work culture which encourages 
it.  ‘Changing mind-sets’ takes a generation, and cannot just be left to the ‘risk and 
assumptions’ column of a log-frame.   
8.2.2  Assess a Wider Range of Risks 
Development aid is well know for its changing fashions and priorities.  What if shifts to 
BS is just another of them?  What needs to be done to ensure that is not the case?  
 
One challenge is of DPs, like USAID and JICA who do not share the same analysis.  
Unicef and UNESCO, at least in Tanzania are not in the forefront of education sector, 
and certainly do not play a coordinating role, despite their UN mandate.  DfID and the 
World Bank tend to show impatience with other smaller and technical assistance agencies 
whose focus remains more project based and sectoral.  Whilst not advocating moving 
forward on the basis of ‘lowest common denominator’, there are risks involved in not 
having greater consistency and coherence in DP approaches.   
 
One such is the gaps moving to BS might leave, and how they could be filled.  Despite 
the intention that the budget process should be all encompassing, there are risks of gaps 
in its coverage, due for example, to problems with getting from identifying a priority to 
reflecting in the budget.  Such gaps could well be filled by projects and funds, over which 
the government budget has little or no control.  Some of the biggest non-governmental 
players, could fill perceived gaps with sufficiently large projects or funds (such as area 
based programmes, or education funds on a TASAF model) to distort at least local 
government planning activities, with off-budget and non-accountable interventions.   
8.2.3  Be Clear and Consistent 
Consistency within agencies:  Within agencies, audit and legal departments at HQ 
remain behind their officers in the field over moves towards harmonisation.  Not only 
does this maintain transaction costs, it gives confusing messages about the seriousness of 
reform.  Sector specialists are similarly not always in line with their own policy analysts 
or Heads of Aid.  New projects being discussed at the same time as budget support is 
being promoted is similarly sending out confusing messages.   
 
Rhetoric and reality:  Sometimes activities supported by donors create incentives which 
are the opposite of what they intend.  One such is ad hoc workshops, often arranged to 
support a priority concern
33.  When government officers are paid as resource people, a 
number of issues emerge: 
                                                 
33 As opposed to workshops within the context of a strategy of capacity development Final version 
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¾  There is an opportunity cost of workshops in terms of delays caused in processing 
files and making decisions: core government business not carried out.  The funder 
of the workshop may not see the problem, and they benefit in terms of 
demonstrated achievement in workshop held, and good attendance by government 
officers, but it is experienced in other parts of the government system, and by end 
users of government services 
¾  It promotes a mindset of increasing transaction costs – the attitude that some 
decisions cannot be made until there has been a workshop on the subject, and 
workshops are also personally remunerative to those involved.  This is a mindset 
which donors have helped to generate despite their rhetoric of reducing 
transaction costs.   
¾  It goes against other efficiency reforms in the public service.  Paying officers as 
resource people to carry out training, as a ‘perk’ involving duties beyond an 
existing job description, is not as sustainable and effective as funding the civil 
service properly and, where required, building a training role into a job 
description so that the training is part of that officer’s job, and doesn’t have the 
opportunity cost mentioned above.   
8.2.3  Promote Local Accountability 
Sustainability will come ultimately through good governance based on local 
accountability, and yet promoting this has been one of the weaker areas of donor activity 
to date.  National as opposed to government ownership, would be hard distinction to 
make judgement on in many donor countries.  The role of civil society is much less 
thought through than many of the other developments, and tends to be left with more 
junior officers in the various agencies.  Government concerns about the dangers of 
national fragmentation caused by CSOs that are seen to be hostile and negative are 
insufficiently understood.  At the same time, the rapid speed of ‘pushing forward the 
debate’, means that in practice very few CSOs are able to keep up with, let alone engage 
constructively in dialogue about the on-going reforms.     
 
Local accountability needs to be institutionalised.  The way PEDP has put money down 
to school level, backed by training of school committees is an excellent start.  It can be 
built on through the promotion of district education boards and other forums, so that 
consultations and information, education and communication (IEC) loops are not always 
ad hoc.   
 
When local accountability and participation is promoted, as was done usefully over the 
development of the new PRS, it needs to be done comprehensively, and take the 
opportunity to inform the public about the much less discussed conditionalities, which go 
along for example, with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, so that citizens have 
a real understanding of what they are engaging with and how far their views will be taken 
on board.   
 Final version 
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8.2.4  Communicate Clearly and Openly 
This underpins much of the argument about coming to a common understanding with 
government about sector level developments.  At a more macro-level, there have been 
potentially constructive moves to ‘leave government alone’ during quiet periods, such as 
during budget preparation, when visiting missions and so on would be particularly 
disruptive.  It is not an easy job to sit back and wait while key documents like the PRS or 
the JAS are developed.  There seems to be a pregnant silence on the part of donors 
waiting on the sidelines, but ready to pounce with the collective force of a range of high 
powered analysis, on whatever is produced.  Before such a document emerges, the 
language is used of ‘signalling to government’ – which produces images of flags being 
waved in semaphore, and government officers having to second guess what they need to 
write in order to meet with donor approval.   
 
More specifically there has to be clear discussion of what key terminology like 
partnership, ownership and leadership actually means.  In practice this rarely gets beyond 
platitudes about ‘government being in the driving seat’, followed by jokes about ‘but not 
as the chauffeur’.  Some DPs see the way forward in shorter and simpler MoUs, which 
take less time to discuss and get approval for.  However, the fewer the words, the more 
the risk that they are imbued with a meaning by one group, which is not shared by 
another.  It is often the behaviour after the MoU which causes the problem, and these 
issues need to be clarified between the people who will implement it, rather than rushed 
through just to get the funds flowing.  One way forward would be an MoU which has a 
short section on principles and a longer section with more administrative details and 
agreement as to adherence to the MoU is to be monitored, which could be amended with 
greater flexibility, rather than the kind of MoU which the PFP have now, which is widely 
regarded as cumbersome and out of date.   
  
   
8 8. .3 3      F Fo or r   G Go ov ve er rn nm me en nt t   
Many of the recommendations are similar to those for donors, about clarity and pursuit of 
clear aims and objectives and effective communication of what these are.  In addition, 
however, the following would be constructive.   
8.3.1  Ensure Current Management and Practices are Well Carried Out 
Despite the tying up of some key officers in processes of forwarding reform programmes, 
or in the transaction costs of donor liaison to access funding, ordinary work still goes on, 
and it is necessary to ensure that it goes on well.  Work plans must be well written and 
followed through, existing structures, such as the directorate system, adhered to, and 
audit queries responded to, and so on
34.   MOEC is better than some ministries, but to 
build confidence of all stakeholders in the system, good practice and proper procedures 
must be seen to be adhered to.   
 
                                                 
34 MOEC still has 43 audit queries outstanding since 1996/7, and 44.7m TSh of ‘irregular and questionable 
payments.  URT (2004) Education Sector PER, page 10.   Final version 
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Legislative amendment to clarify the roles of responsibilities, particularly in terms of 
financial flows, of MOEC and PO-RALG, is a priority.   
Greater Realism and Assertiveness  
There is a great deal to be gained from being more realistic about what can and cannot be 
achieved.  DPs by and large want to support success, and if they are persuasively shown 
that the way forward is different to what they are proposing, many of them will listen.  
This realism could usefully be based on:  
¾  promoting national debate about the role of education in development, and what 
poor people say they need from their schooling to help them eradicate poverty 
¾  focussing on capacity development, building out from the basis of existing civil 
service capacity to run the sector, to move away from the situation where a few 
officers are pulled into a dominant role in overseeing PEDP, without the strength 
and depth to see sector reform through. 
 
8.3.2  Greater Risk Taking 
This is an exciting time for Tanzania.  Being the focus of donor enthusiasm for the kinds 
of reforms President Mkapa’s leadership has brought about, opportunities are available 
now which may not be there indefinitely.  It is critically necessary to take advantage of 
the opportunities – by taking the risk to say no when proffered aid has more costs than 
benefits, and by taking the risk to take more from the aid process where its terms and 
conditions can bring sustainable benefits.   
 
 
9 9. .      C Co on nc cl lu us si io on n   
 
None of the stakeholders in the education sector at national level is comfortable with the 
current situation: frustration and disappointment abound, but fortunately alongside a 
strong sense that things could be different and better.  There is a need for all players to 
step back and appreciate the saying that ‘when you point the finger at somebody else, 
three fingers are pointing back at yourself’, and to reflect honestly on the confusing 
signals about needs and priorities which are being made, and to move forward towards a 
few genuinely shared and strategically chosen goals.  These need to focus on the process 
as well as the product of the relationship, rather than just dressing it in the comfortable 
language of ‘development partnership’.  The alternative is continuing with the kind of 
transaction costs which bear little fruit in terms of genuine partnership, and which are 
really only another of the costs of poverty.   
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